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to saying in most cases that there is to be no remedy whatever.
He also says that the Connecticut decree might be overhauled in
the same manner; which is true when properly understood, i. e. it
might be, if obtained by a like fraud.1
D.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,at Ni8i rrius, December, 1854.2
WILLTAM THOMAS vs. JAMES CROSSIN, ET AL.
1.'The 7th section of the Act of Congress, of 2d March, 1833, commonly called
"The Force Bill," which authorizes the writ of habeas coryus to be issued by the
courts of the United States, under certain circumstances, for the protection of
officers,sand others acting with them, in execution of the laws of the United
States is t be confined in its application to cases, where there has been an
- stowed purpose, by some authority or law of a state, to disregard an act of Con,gresa, and-to imprison or otherwise punish the officers of the United States for enforcing it; and operates, moreover, only in cases where such purpose appears on
theface of the yroceedinqs. Where a habeas corpus has been issued in pursuance of
the statut, bya United States Court, it has no right to go behind thereturn to the
writ; and if it does, and discharges the relator, upon evidence taken at the hearing, such discharge is inoperative, and will be disregarded by a state court.
2. The marshal and-deputy marshals of the C. C. for the Eastern District of Pennpylvania, were arrested under a capins, in a civil action of assault and battery,
for abuse of -power, brought in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. - They took
out a habeas corpus to the Circuit Court. On the hearing, evidence as to the real
cause of action in the suit was entered into, and the relators discharged. The
sheriff returned these facts to the capias. An attachment was applied for by
the plaintiff against the sheriff, for not bringing in the bodies of the defendants.
The court held that the discharge by the United States Court was invalid, but
refused the attachment under the circumstances, the plaintiff having unneccesarily
delayed his application. It was decided, however, that the defendants might be
considered as discharged on common bail, and that the plaintiff might proceed
regularly in his action.
I Since the above article was written,, the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York have affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in Dobson vs. Pearce
D.
(December Term, 1854,) upon Dobson's ppeal.
2Before Lzwis, C. J., and WooDwAnD, T.
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This was an action of trespass, vi et armis, against Wynkoop,
marshal, and Crossin, Jenkins and Keith, deputy marshals of the
United States, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
In order to the proper understanding of the case, which has been
before the courts in several shapes before, it is necessary to state,
briefly, the circumstances out of which it arose, and the nature of
the previous proceedings.
In the fall of 1853, a warrant, under the Act of 1850, issued
out of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for the arrest of a negro by the name of
Bill Thomas, as a fugitive slave, which was placed in the hands of
the marshal and deputy marshals, the defendants above named.
An attempt was made by them to seize Thomas, in the town of
Wilkesbarre. He resisted, and a violent contest ensued, in which,
though very severely injured, he succeeded in escaping. It has
been alleged that the officers behaved with great and unnecessary
brutality on the occasion; but this has been denied, and the truth
of the charge is not at present material. It is sufficient to state,
that the affray caused much excitement in the neighborhood, and
that a third person believing the officers to have abused their
authority, applied for and obtained a warrant for their arrest, on a
charge of assault and battery with intent to kill, under which they
were arrested. The negro had by that time fled from the state.
A habeas corpus was immediately taken out from the Circuit Court
by the officers. On the hearing, Mr. Justice Gfier admitted evidence of the real state of facts, and discharged the relators, under
the Act of Congress of March 2, 1833, called the Force Bill.'
I This case willbe found reported under the name of exparte Jenkins, in2 American Law Register, 144, and in 2 Wallace, Jr. Rep., 521. The charge was persisted
in by the prosecutor, notwithstanding this discharge, and an indictment subsequently found against the defendants by the Grand Jury of Luzerne County, for riot
and assault and battery with intent to kill A bench warrant of outlawry was then
issued by the Quarter Sessions, to the sheriff of Philadelphia County, under which
the officers were again arrested. Another habea8 corpm was issued out of the Cir-'
cuit Court of the United States, and they were then discharged once more. 2
Wall. Jr. 539.
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The present action was then brought by Thomas, or by his friends,
in his name, against the officers, in the Supreme Court of the State.
Two affidavits to hold to bail were filed, not by the plaintiff, but by
other persons. According to the statement in Mr. Wallace's report,' these affidavits "showed that on the day of the arrest of
Thomas, he came out of a hotel in Wilkesbarre, .wounded, -bleeding,
and faint-that he was pursued-that there was a cry of ' shoot
him,' and the sound of pistol shots-that he made his way to the
river, and plunged in, declaring that he 'never would be taken'that he subsequently came out, but was driven back again, at the
water's edge, by a presented pistol-that there were many persons
on the river bank, some of whom were menacing, and some who are
spoken of (in the affidavits) as the ' pursuers,' and ' the officers'that among the persons on the bank were three, of whom one witness says he "saw two in the court-room, one was Wynkoop, and
the other a big man' he thinks 'was Crossin,'-and that soon after
the return of the officers to the hotel, the fugitive having escaped in
the meantime, a colloquy of an excited character took place between
two gentlemen at the hotel, in which one of them announced himself
as Judge Collins, and the other as 'John Jenkins, U. S. Deputy
Marshal.' Nothing, however, was said about Keith, the fourth
party now arrested." On these affidavits a capias was allowed by
a Judge of the Supreme Court, with bail in the sum of $3,000.
The defendants were arrested, and not giving bail, were committed
to prison. A habeas corpus was again sued out by them, from the
Circuit Court of the United States, and heard before his honor,
Judge Kane, the District Judge. Under the decision of Mr. Justice Grier, in the previous case, and on the ground of the uncertainty
and insufficiency of the affidavits, the learned judge discharged the
relators. The Sheriff returned these facts to the writ of capias.
After the lapse of about nine months, a motion was now made in
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, at Nisi Prins, for an attachment against the sheriff of Philadelphia County, on the ground of
an insufficient return, and for a failure to bring in the bodies of the
'2 Wallace, Jr., 581.
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defendants. The question was argued before 'their honors, Chief
Justice Lewis and Judge Woodward.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LEwis, C. J.-On the 31st of January, 1854, a capias issued out
of this Court, in an action of trespass vi et armi for assault and
battery, in which bail was ordered by Mr. Justice Woodward, in
the sum of $5,000. The writ was returnable .on the first Monday
in February, 1854. The defendants named in the writ were arrested
by the sheriff, and on the 6th day of February, 1854, that officer
was served with a writ of habeas corpus, purporting to have issued
out of the Circuit Court of the United States, commanding him to
bring the bodies of the prisoners, together with the cause of detainer,
before "the honorable John K. Kane, one of the judges of the said
Circuit Court." On the 14th February, 1854, the said Circuit Court
of the United States, having the bodies of the prisoners before it,
together with the cause of 'detainer, duly certified, (to wit, the writ
of capias issued out of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,) proceeded to hear evidence, and after said hearing, decided that the
said prisoners were "under confinement and restrained of their
liberty by authority of Samuel Allen, high sheriff of the County
of Philadelphia, for acts done by them in pursuance of a law of the
United States and of process issuing from a judge thereof;" and
thereupon the Circuit Court of the United States ordered the prisoners to be discharged from confinement. The sheriff obeyed this
order, and made return of the facts to this Court. On the 14th
November, 1854, nine months after the prisoners were discharged,
the plaintiff obtained the present rule on the sheriff to show cause
why an attachment should not issue against him for want of a sufficient return to the original writ.
Was the sheriff bound to obey the order made by the Circuit
Court of the United States ? The answer to this question depends
upon another: Had the Circuit Court jurisdiction over the parties
and the question in the manner in which it was exercised? In colisidering a question of this kind, it should not be forgotten that the
States of this Union are separate, free and independent sovereign-
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ties, in all particulars, except those over which theyhave voluntarily
given the control to the government of the United States; that the
States are, in general, unlimited in their authority, while the United
States government is one of limited and enumerated powers, and is
strictly confined to the exercise of the powers thus enumerated.
This fundamental principle of the Union is distinctly stated in the
Federal Constitution itself. After enumerating the powers granted
to the United States, the Constitution proceeds to declare that "1the
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." It is upon this principle of State sovereignty
that each State has an undoubted right to regulate its own domestic
institutions according to its own wisdom, and that neither its sister
States, nor the Congress of the United States, have any right to
interfere with such regulation.
The Constitution of the United States went into operation in
March, 1789. In September following, the first Congress under it
passed the "4act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United
States." In that act the section which gave the Federal Courts
power to issue writs of habeas corpus, contained a proviso that
those writs "shall in no case extend to prisoners in jail, unless
where they are in custody, under or by color of authority of the
United Statet, or are committed for trial before some Court of the
same, or are necessary to be brought into Court to testify." This
act was in conformity to the principles of the Union, and was passed
when the discussions on the distribution of powers were fresh in the
public recollection, and the subject was well understood by all.
There was a manifest determination to guard the rights of the
States, and to prohibit the Judges of the Federal tribunals from
coming into collision with the State Courts, by any attempt to discharge prisoners who were held in custody under State process and
State laws. In accordance with this principle, it was decided in Cabrera's case that the Circuit Court of the United States could not
on habeas corpus discharge even a foreign Secretary of Legation
from State process. 1 W. C. C. 232. And in Dorr's case, in 1845,
it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States, that no
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(Iourt or Judge of the United States "can issue a habeas corpus to
bring up a prisoner who is in custody under sentence or execution
of a State Court, for any other purpose than to be a witness," and
that "it is immaterial whether the imprisonment be under civil or
criminal process," and that even " an individual who maybe indicted
in a Circuit Court of the United States, for treason against the
United States, is beyond the power of the Federal Courts and
Judges, if he be in custody'under the authority of a State." Exparte Dorr, 3 Howard, 105:
But the act of 2d March, 1853, sec. 7, gives the United States
Judges powers somewhat more extensive than those previously
exercised. By that section " either of the justices of the Supreme
Court, or a judge of any Districi Court of the United States, shall
have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner
or prisoners in jail or confinement, on or by any authority or law,
for any act done or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of
the United States, or any order, process or decree of any judge or
court thereof." Now it is exceedingly clear that there is a great
difference between imprisonment for an act done in obedience to the
authority of the United States, and being held to bail inan action
of trespass for an assault and battery committed without such
authority. The defendants in this action were in the latter predicament ; there was nothing in the nature of the action, nor in the
form of the writ, nor in the affidavits presented to the judge who
fixed the amount of bail, which contained the slightest indication
that they were sued for "any act done, or omitted to be done, in
pursuance of any law of the United States, or any order, process
or decree of any judge or court thereof." No State law had been
passed authorizing such imprisonment. No judicial action had
taken place in any manner countenancing such opposition to the
authority of the United States. On the contrary, a large majority
of the people of this State, and all the departments of the State
government, stood in the most perfect fealty to the Constitution and
laws of the United States. Neither at the time the act of 183
was passed, nor at the time of the recent action of the United States
Circuit Court, under its supposed authority, was there any reason
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to believe that any officer of the United States Government, or
other person, would or could be imprisoned by authority of this
State for acts done under the authority of' the United States.
So far from this being the case, the State authorities constantly
recognized all the constitutional powers of the United States; and
the law of the United States would have been recognized in the
State judiciary as a justification for any act done in pursuance of
them, as fully as any Court of the United States had a right to
recognize them. Under these circumstances, has the act of Congress of 1833 any application to the present case ? The words of
the act do not embrace it. They are confined to imprisonment for
acts done or committed 'under the authority of the United States.

The action and imprisonment in this case was for an assault and
battery without authority of any law whatever. But it is conceded

that a statute must be expounded, not according to its letter, but
according to its meaning, and that even a thing which is within the
letter of a statute is not within the statute unless it be within the
intention of the makers, 11 Rep. 73; Bac. Ab. tit. Statute 1;
Dwarris onStatutes, 690, 691, 692. It is an established rule of
construction, that "the intention of the law-maker and the meaning
of the law are to be discovered and deduced fro'm a view of the
whole and every part of a statute taken and compared together. It

is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute, to construe
one part by any other part of the same statute;, for that best
expresses the meaning of the maker, and such construction is ex
vieeribus actus." 1 Inst. 381 ; Dwarris, 698. "The words and
meaning of one part of a statute frequently lead to the sense of
another, and in the construction of one part of a statute every
other part ought to be taken into consideration." Stowel vs. Zouch,
Plowden, 365; 2 Inst. 310; Dwarris, 698. It is also a rule equally
well established, that the "old law and the mischief," or, what is
the same thing, "the occasion and the reason of the enactment,"
are to be considered in ascertaining its meaning. Dwarris 702.
With these rules before us, let us examine the several provisions of
the act of Congress of 2d March, 1833, and let us look also into
"the occasion and the reason of the enactment."
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It is well known that the people of the United'States have been
divided in opinion in regard to the power of Congress to lay duties
and imposts on foreign importations for the protection of domestic
manufactures. The power to lay these duties for the purpose of
raising revenue for the support of government was not doubted; but
a large portion of the people denied the power to lay them "for the
purpose of giving bounties to classes and individuals engaged in
particular employments* at. the expense and. to the injury and
oppression of other classes and individuals." One of the Southern
States, South Carolina, carried its opposition so far as to assemble
in convention and to pass an ordinance, on the 24th of November,
1832, expressly declaring "the laws for imposing duties and
imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, especially the
acts of Congress of 19th May, 1828, and 14th July, 1882, to be
null, void, and no law, nor binding upon the State, its officers and
citizens." The ordinance further declared that "it shall not be
lawful for any of the constituted authorities of the United States to
enforce the payment of duties imposed by the said acts within the
limits of the State," and made it the duty of the Legislature to
"adopt such measures and pass such acts as may be necessary to
give full effect to this ordinance, and to prevent the enforcement,
and arrest the operation of the said acts of Congress within the
said State." On the 20th December, 1832, the Legislature of
South Carolina, in obedience to this direction, actually passed an
act to carry into effect this ordinance of nullification. It authorized
writs of habeas corpus to relieve from imprisonment, writs of replevin to retake property seized, and other actions to recover back
money collected, and to recover damages for injuries incurred,
under the said actsof Congress imposing duties on foreign imports.
It declared all sales of property under judgments in the United
States Courts, for the said duties, null and void, aiid prohibited the
clerks of the State courts from furnishing copies of any judgment
of a State court, where the validity of the said acts of Congress
was drawn in question, to any person, for the purpose of reviewing
the same in the United States Courts. It authorized the Sheriff to
resist any attempt of the United States officers to recapture property
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under pretence of the said acts of Congress, and punished ly fine
an4 imprisonment any United States officers, or others, who should
disobey, obstruct or resist the process allowed by the nullification
act, or should cloign, secrete, or wilfully remove any property
seized for'said duties, or do any other act to prevent the same from
being replevied by the State process, or should, after the same had
been replevied, recapture or seize, or attempt to recapture or seize
the same, "under pretence of securing the duties imposed by any
of the several acts of Congress aforesaid, or for the non-payment of
any such duties, or under any process, order or decree, or other
pretext, contrary to the ordinance aforesaid." It prohibited the
use of the public jails, or the letting to hire of any private building
as a jail, for the purpose of imprisoning any one under the said
acts of Congress.
Here was an open nullification of certain acts of Congress-an
avowed intention to resist them-a denial of the -right of appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States-and a'determination to
punish by fine and imprisonment any officer of the United States,
or any person who aided him in the performance of his duty under
such acts of Congress. The offence, as described in the statute of
nullification, was acting in obedience to the acts of Congressfor the
imposition of duties on forein imports. The 'warrant of arrest and
the indictment would necessarily, in all cases, describe the offence
as it was described in the statute creating. it, and would, therefore,
show upon theirface -that the imprisonment was' "for an act done,
or omitted to he done, under a law of the United States."
To relieve against such an imprisonment required no trial by
jury, for no facts could be in dispute. The whole case was resolved
into a pure question of law, whether a State had the power to nullify an act of Congress. In view of these circumstances, and for
the purpose of counteracting these proceedings of the State of South
Carolina, the act of Congress of the 2d March, 1833, commonly
called "the Force Bill," was passed. It directed the custom-houses
to be kept in some secure place, either on land, or on board any
vessel. It authorized the employment of the army and navy, and
the militia of the United States, to protect and aid the custom-house
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officers and others in the collection of the said duties. It gave the
Circuit Courts of the United States,jurisdiction of all suits against
the United States officers, and others who aided them in the collection of the revenue, and authorized the removal of such suits from
the State Courts into the United States Courts for trial. It authorized suits in the United States Courts for the recovery of damages for any injury done to them for the performance of their duties
under the revenue laws. It declared all property seized for duties
to be irrepleviable, and it Punished by fine and imprisonment any
person who should rescue, or attempt to rescue, any property taken
to enforce the payment of the said duties. It provided for supplying by secondary evidence the records of the State Courts where
the copies thereof. could not otherwise be obtained; and where the
public jails and private houses were not allowed to be used as places
of imprisonment to enforce the payment of duties, it authorized the
marshal to use other convenient places.
After these provisions, all of which were plainly intended to counteract and provide for the exigencies created by the act of nullification, the seventh section followed, giving to the United States Judges
the powers in respect to writs of habeas corpus, which are now the
subject of consideration in this case. It is impossible to look into
the history of the country without seeing that this section was intended specially to remedy the evils caused by the nullification of
South Carolina. It is equally impossible to read the enactments
of that State, in relation to the revenue laws of the United States,
and compare them with the provisions of the act of 2d March, 1833,
without perceiving that the special object of the latter was to counteract the former, and that the general purpose and language of
the act of Congress was confined to that object alone. It cannot,
therefore, by any known rule in expounding statutes' be carried by
construction to matters not within the letter nor spirit of the act,
nor within the mischief to be remedied. It must be confined to
cases where there is an avowed purpose, by some authority or law
of a State, to disregard an act of Congress, and to imprison or
otherwise punish the officers of the United States and their assistants, for enforcing it, and operates only in cases where this purpose
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appears on the face of the proceedings. No authority was given to
the United States judges to go behind the cause of detainer returned
on the writ of habeas corpus, and to investigate and try questions
of fact without the intervention of a jury, or to adjudge that the
cause of detainer was other than that which appeared on the face of
the return. No such extraordinary power was called for by the
exigency of the case, and therefore, no such authority was given by
the act. It was far otherwise in the celebrated case of Alexander
McLeod. Ie was indicted for murder, committed within the jurisdiction of the State of New York, (25 Wend. 483.) The British
government avowed the act complained of, and demanded bis discharge. By the law of nations, the command of the sovereign is a
justification for any act which the sovereign himself, according to
the same law, has a right to commit. But it did not appear upon
the face of theproceedings either that the act was authprized by the
British government, or that the entry into a neutral territory, by
an armed band of men, in the secresy of midnight, in a time of profound peace, and without any preliminary notice of hostility, or
demand of redress for supposed injuries, and the destruction of property and assassination of citizens therein. was such an act as any
government had a right to authorize, or could justify under the
rules which now control the conduct of civilized nations.
As the federal authority is responsible to foreign governments
for the proper decision of all such questions, it was deemed proper
to give the federal courts jurisdiction over' them; and therefore, in
all cases where the subject of another nation is confined under authority of law for any act under the sanction of his sovereign, the
validity of which may depend upon the law of nations, the act of
Congress of 29th August, 1842, authorizes the United States judges
to issue writs of habeas corpus, and, upon the return, to "hear the
cause" and to receive proof of the justification relied upon. This
power was deemed absolutely necessary, to enable the general government to meet its responsibilities to foreign nations, and to save the
country from being involved in a war through the action of State
authorities. But even in this extraordinary exigency, full provisions were made in the act for an appeal'from the decision of the
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judge on habeas corpus to the Supreme Court of the Unites States.
But no such provisions are contained in the act of 1833. No anthbrity is given to "hear the cause," nor to receive proofs apart
from the cause of detainer returned. The difference between the
two acts, and the diversity in the several occasions which produced
them, plainly show that Congress intended that the powers granted
by and the mode of action under them should also be different. In
the one case the judges were confined to the cause of .detainer returned, for the reason that this was all that was required to accomplish the object of the act. In the other, they were authorized to
go behind the return, and to inquire into the facts and merits of the
justification relied on; for nothing short of this would effectuate the
manifest intention of the law, or meet the mischief designed to be
remedied.
As no power is given by the act of 1833 to go behind the cause
of detainer returned, the common law furnishes the rule for ascer"taining the extent of the autho ity intended to be conferred by a
frant of the right to issue writs of habeas corpus. "It seems to be
agreed," says Hawkins, in his "Pleas of the Crown," "that no one
can in any case controvert the truth of the return to a habeas corpus,
or plead or suggest any matter repugnant to it;" 2 Hawkins, B. 2,
ch. 15, s. 18; 2 Str. 851, ib. 1138; i Leach, 270; 4 Hayw. 165;
25 Wend. 569; 4 Dall. 413. There are, it is true, exceptions to
this rule, under which a confession and avoidance has been allowed,
and men who have been impressed into his Britannic Majesty's service; and: were about to be carried into foreign parts, have been
allowed to controvert the truth of the return, in order to prevent a
total failure of the object of the writ. Fortunately for the security
of our citizens, we have no such intolerable slavery here as that
existing under the English law of impressment. There is, therefore,
no occasion for an exception to the rule of law, inorder to relieve'
any one who happens to be so fortunate as to be privileged from
such an outrage. But Sir Michael Foster, in speaking of this rule
and the exception to it, correctly declares that "exceptions do not
destroy, but rather establish a general rule."
It is true, also, that statutes have been enacted in England, and
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in the several States, giving to the Courts, in certain cases, the
power to inquire into the facts and to controvert the truth of the
return. These enactments serve to prove the rule of the common
law. But there is a difference between controverting the truth of
the return to a habeas corpus, and trying, or retrying, upon evidence, the merits of the cause of detainer set forth in the return.
Even under the statute, it has been held that the latter cannot be
done, "because it trenches on the office of the jury," 25 Wend. 569.
But the habeas corpus acts of the several States can give no authority to the courts of the United States. If they did, it would be
impossible to say which of the statutes of the several States must
control; and it must be manifest that where the object of an act of
Congress is to counteract the State laws, it would be altogether repugnant to the purpose of the act, and would tend to defeat its
operation, to adopt the statutes of the refractory State as the rule
of decision. In Burr's trial, Chief Justice Marshall, in speaking
of writs of habeas corpus under the act of 1789, furnished the true
construction of the act of 1833. He declared that the "principles
and usages of law mean those general principles and usages which
are to be found, not in the legislative acts of any particularState,
but in that generally recognized and long established law which
forms the substratum of the laws of every State." By this he
means the Common Law. The act of Congress of 1833 must therefore be understood to confer upon the United States judges nothing
more than the power to proceed on these writs, according to the
rule of the common law. By that rule the judges had no right to
-controvert the truth of the return. But more especially were they
prohibited from trying, without a jury, and without the means of
reviewing their decision, the facts and merits of the cause of detainer
set forth in the return.
But by the true construction of the act of 1833, it is confined to
cases of imprisonment for executing the revenue laws. And even
in those cases, it was not intended to discharge, without security
for their appearance, persons who were arrested on mesne process,
for the purpose of compelling them to give bail to an action. This
is fairly to be inferred from the general provisions of the act. In
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suits. in the State courts"for anything done under the revenue laws,
ample provision is made in the'act f6r the removal of those causes
into. the United States Courts for trial therein, according to the
course of the common law, with a right of review in the tribunal of
the last resort; and in the, meantime, so far from discharging the
persons in custody in such actions, without bail, the marshal is ex,piessly directed by the act to take the bodies of the defendants into
R8 custody, to be dealt -with, in 'the said cause, according to the
rules of laiw, and the order of the -Circuit Court, or any. judge
thereof in vacation. And "all attachments made, and all bail and
other security given upon such suits," are expressly directed to
"continue in like force and effeef as if the said suits-had proceeded
to final judgment and execution in the State coirt.", There is no
injustice in permitting the -habeas corpus action to operate in cases
of this kind, where ample provision is, made to secu're the prisoners
in custody until bail is entered, and to hold the bail until the final
decision is made. It deprives the parties of no rights. It merely
changes the forum. But there is no provision for the removal of
other actions, or for securing -a trial therein; or for an appeal, or
for holding the prisoners until bail be entered; or for continuing the
liability of the bail until the final decision, so that if this sectidn be
construed to authorize the discharge of.prisoners arrested for other
causes, in the State courts, it operates as a complete denial of justice.- It virtually arrests the proceedings in the State courts without providing a remedy elsewhere.'. It'violates the great constitutional injunction that " everyman for an injury done him shall have
remedy by due course of law." It'constitutes a subordinate judge
the exclusive arbiter of, questions -of,fact and law, contrary to the
fundamental principle of the trial by jury: "'Ad questiones facti
non respondent judices; ad questiones legis non respondent juratores." It is impossible to believe that the nationial legislature intended any such violation of private rights, or disregard of fundamental principles. The whole history of the act in question, and
all its provisions, are at variance with any such construction.
If a prisoner may be discharged from mesne process in- his way,,
he -may also be relieved from' 'final process; by the same means.
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The act of Congress is as operative in the last case as in the first.
Indeed, it was manifestly intended to relieve against the final judgments in a State which punished public officers for performing their
duties, and allowed of no appeal from its decisions. Without giving
the act in operation upon imprisonment under final judgments of
State Courts, it would fail of its great object, which was to relieve
against- open acts of nullification by State authority. If the act be
extended to cases where no such intention appears, and be applied,
as it must be, to final process, let us look at its operation. The
plaintiff brings his action for an injury not authorized by any law
whatever. The defendant alleges that the act was authorized by a
law of the United States. The Constitution of the State declares
tl~t "the trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof
remain inviolate." The Constitution of the United States is equally
emphatic in the provision that "in suits at common law,. where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury'shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law." The sum in controversy
exceeds twenty dollars-the suit is a suit at common law. The
parties accordingly go to trial before a jury, and the decision is
solemnly pronounced, according to the rules of the common law,
that the defendant had no authority, under the act of Congress,
to do the injury complained of. The Constitution of the United
States and the act of Pongress of 1789, give the parties the right
to review this decision in the Supreme Court of the United States
by writ of error, where; if it be erroneous, the judgment would be
reversed, and the cause sent back for a new trial before another jury.
But according to the onstruction of the act of 1833, as now claimed
in this case, all these proceedings are nugatory and void ! A single
judge of the District Court of the United States may, it is alleged,
re-examine the merits-disregard the verdict and judgment-and,
without a trial by jury, or right of appeal, may discharge the defendant from imprisonment under the execution. If this may be
done, what becomes of the inestimable right of trial by jury? 'Of
what avail is the- solemn guaranty of that right contained in the
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State Constitution? Of what force is even the express provision
in its favor, as set forth in the Constitution of the United States?
Of what consequence are the laws of the several States? Of what
value is the process, or even the most solemn judgment of any State
Court in the Union? Are all the independent States of this great
confederacy to be trodden in the, dust, at the foot of a single subordinate judge? The Congress of the United States is patriotic and
enlightened, but its members are the free representatives of independent States. The national army and navy are irresistible in
war, but its soldiers and sailors are the true-hearted citizens and
sons of the several States. The Union is great and glorious indeed,
but it is the creature of the States, and the stars that glitter on its
banner represent the proud and powerful sovereignties from whih
it derives its existence, its support, and its lustre. When these are
extinguished, the Union itself will be lost in the gloom of anarchy
or despotism. This truth was beautifully expressed by the Chief
Magistrate of the Union, when he declared it to be a duty of high
obligation "to preserve sacred from all touch of usurpation, as the
very palladium of our political salvation, the reserved rights of the
States and the people."
The act of 1833 has been in existence more than twenty years.
It was passed, as we have seen, for the special purpose of granting
relief to the United States officers and their assistants, where a
State undertook to imprison them for executing the revenue laws of
the United States, and it was intended to 4apply only to cases in
which that purpose was openly avowed, and was 8et forth on the
face of the cause of detainer itself. From the day of its enactment
to the time of making the recent orders of the Circuit Court, in the
matters connected with the plaintiff's case, it has never been supposed to apply to any other purpose. No case has been produced
to furnish a precedent for the action of the Circuit Court; and, so
far as our knowledge extends, no such authority exists. If the act
admitted of such extensive operation as that contended for in this
case, there must have been very many opportunities for so applying
it. In a government of such vast extent, and with officers so
numerous, and engaged in such a variety of duties, it is not likely
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that they have been more fortunate or circumspect than other citizens, in avoiding personal liability for violating the rights of others.
They must, in the nature of things, have been as frequently called
to account for their actions as other officers. If it had been supposed for a moment that they were above the law, and that they
were not bound, like other citizens, to submit their pleas of justification to "the judgment of their peers," the Courts of the United
States would have been flooded with applications for these convenient privileges. Those tribunals, like cities of refuge, would have
been crowded with fugitives from the justice of every State in the
Union.
The habeas corpus, in this case, was issued under the seal of the
Circuit Court of the United States. It commanded the sheriff to
bring the prisoners before "one of the judges" of that Court. The
sheriff made his return "to the judges" of that Court, and the
order for the discharge of the prisoners was made by that Court, as
a Court,and not by a single "justice," or "judge." The authority
to issue writs of habeas corpus, in the cases provided by that statute,
is distinctly confined to "either of the justices of the Supreme
Court, or a judge of any District Court." It is needless to say
that a special authority like this must be strictly pursued, and that
no "justice of the Supreme Court," nor "judge of the District
Court," has any right to avoid or divide the solemn responsibility
of the high and perilous trust reposed in him by the act. If he
acts at all, it must be his sole and separate act, either as a "justice
of the Supreme Court" or as a "judge of the DistrictCourt." He
cannot fold himself up in the imposing mantle of the Circuit Court;
for that Court, as a Court, has no jurisdiction whatever under the
section supposed to sanction this order of discharge. It was manifestly intended, by the act of Congress, that when the rights of
the States or the parties, are thus intefered with, they should
know who directed it, and in what capacity he acted.
The United States stands in no need of means to enforce her
laws. Her Supreme Court claims and exercises jurisdiction by
writ of error over the judgments of the Courts of the last resort in
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under the laws of the Union, and that right has been denied.
Their jurisdiction is claimed and exercised in civil as well as criminal cases ; so'that there was no necessity whatever for a resort to
the indignity of obstructing State process, and Contemning State
authority, in the manner attempted in this case. It is impossible
to believe that the representativis of free States ever intended to
authorize any such unnecessary infringement of the r~served rights
of the States and the people. Neither the words of the section
relied on, nor the general prdvisions of the act, nor the occasion
which called it into existence, nor the general rules of the common
law by which it must be expounded, nor. any usage under it, nor
any other circumstances of propriety or necessity, indicate any
such intention. We are, 'therefore, of opinion, that the Circuit
Court of the United States had no jurisdiction whatever over the
parties in this cause, and had no authority to interfere with the
execution of the process of this Court. When a Court of limited
jurisdiction, instituted by a government of enumerated powers,
transcends its authority, its order is no justification to the officer
who obeys it. In this case the sheriff ought not to have obeyed
the order for the discharge of the prisoners.
In giving this opinion, there is not the slightest feeling of disrespect for the learning and integrity of the judges of the Circuit
Court. On the contrary, we can appreciate the feeling and excuse
the errors of a judgment likely to be excited by the disorderly
movements of a class of individuals, who, setting up their own
judgments as a "higher law" than the Constitution, are constantly
endeavoring to defeat the operation of certain laws of the United
States. But these considerations do not absolve us from the discharge of our official obligations. We might have stepped out of
our way to avoid this question for the present. But it lies directly
in our path, and it must be met in this cause, should the plaintiff
proceed by action against the Sheriff, or recover in this suit. To
avoid it would be to countenance encroachment, and would leave
the Sheriff, and other officers charged with the execution of the laws
of the State, in doubts in regard to their official duties. It is better that our opinion should be made known at once, in order that
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the State officers may know their duty, on the one side, while on
the other, those who may feel themselves authorized to obstruct
hereafter the regular and valid process of this Court, without authority, may act with a proper consideration of their responsibilities.
It does not, however, necessarily follow from these views, that
we are bound to commit the sheriff for a contempt of this Court.
This remedy is under the discretion of this Court, and is the appropriate one where there is a corrupt or wilful disobedience of the
commands of the writ; but " where there is neither corruption, nor
any particular obstinacy in relation to the service of such writ, nor
other extraordinary circumstances of wilfuZ negligence, the judgment whereof is left to the discretion of the Court, it is not usual
to grant an attachment; but the party is left to his ordinary remedy
by action against the officer, or by taking out an alias and pluries.
which, if the sheriff do not execute, an attachment goes against
him," of course, unless he give a good excuse for his conduct. 2
Hawk, P. C. b. 2, oh. 22, i. 2. If the plaintiff has not moved for
an attachment in a reasonable time, it will not be granted. The
party will in that case be left to his ordinary remedy by action or
otherwise. Rex vs. Pering, 3 B. & P. 151; Rex vs. Sheriff of
Burry, 9 East, 467; Watson on Sheriffs, 122. In this case there
is not the slightest evidence of wilful misconduct on the part of the
sheriff. It was natural that that excellent officer should respect
the authority of the Circuit Court. The order for the discharge of
the prisoners came to him in the imposing form of a judicial act,
and when all the circumstances are considered, it is not surprising
that he obeyed it. It does not appear that the plaintiff gave any
notice that he would contest its validity, or would hold the sheriff
liable -ifhe regarded it. On the contrary, the plaintiff silently
acquiesced in the discharge from the 14th of February to the 14th
November, 1854, a period of nine months. Under these circumstances it would be unjust to the sheriff to award an attachment.
The defendants may be considered as discharged on common bail)
and the plaintiff may proceed in his action. Should he recover,
the powers of this Court to enforce the execution of the judgment
15
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will be called into action. But the present rule must be discharged.
Mr. Justice Knox, who was present at the argument, fully concurs in'this opinion.
Rule discharged.
Nor.-The following is the opinion delivered by his Honor Judge Kane, on the
discharge of the defendants in this case, as reportedin 2_Wallace, jr. 533:
K&Nz, J.-The seventh section of the Act of Congress, of March 2d, 1833, chapter
57, under which the action of the court in the present instance is to be regulated,
enacts, "That either of the Justices of the Supreme.Court, or a Judge of the District Court, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of prisoners
in confinement, where they shall be confined by any authority of law for any act
done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any process of a judge or court
thereof."
I will not weaken by a repetition, that clear and conclusive exposition of this
section, given by Judge Grier, when this case was before us on the arrest, at the
suit of the Commonwealth, for the assault and battery with intent to kill. But th
say that we may issue a habeas corpus to rescue an officer from imprisonment for
doing his duty, and yet that we shall shut our eyes to the proofs that he did it--to
affirm that a court, called on to inquire whether an imprisonment is tortious,
'must listen to no evidence but that of the tort feasor himself and that of his
accomplices--to protest that wrong is to be done by truth pertinent to the issue-is
to invert the first principles of common sense as well as justice.
What is that issue? Is it whether the learned Judge of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had authority to issue this writ: or whether this writ itself is
formal? No one has contested either of these positions. Is it whether he has
It is no part of my functions to revise his
adjudications; he has his own sphere, and I do not share its responsibilities. He
was called upon to sanction the arrest of trespassers. Affidavits which he regarded
as sufficient, were laid before him, and he granted the arrest. I am called upon to
exercised his functions properly?

relieve an officer of the United States from a false and tortious imprisonment. He
had to'decide, I suppose, whether the party who complained before him had a right
to the process he sought; he has decided that question. I have to inquire whether
under any supposed cover of that process, the laws of the United States have been
violated in the imprisonment of their officers, and this question I am going to
decide.
And how do the learned counsel ask me to prepare for my decision? Because
the judge of a State Court, in a proceeding necessarily ex pare, may have been
imposed on by misstatements or suppressions of fact, am I therefore constrained in
another cause, under another law, within a different constitutional jurisdiction, to
make my hearing ezparte also; to hearken only to him, who has abused, it is said,
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the process of the law by falsehood or fraud, and refuse my ear to him whom the
law specially enjoins me to relieve, if he has been wronged?
What is to be the consequence? A man swears to an assault and battery; the
entire truth told, he was arrested for robbing the mint or the maiL Another swears
to a trespass in breaking his close and carrying away his goods ; the goods were stolen,
and have been recovered under a search warrant. Both affidavits are the truth,
unless thatmeans the whole truth ; they make out theprimafacie case of the plaintiff.
What then? Is the officer to go to prison in default of bail, and to stay there
because the rogue swore to only half the story? Or would the argument change if
the plaintiff should substitute another man's oath for his own, keeping himself
aloof the while, not caring to proclaim his whereabouts?
But this is not to meet the question before me in all its breadth. He who has read
theAct of Congress, of March 2d, 1833, or who remembers the times to meet which it
was passed, knows perfectly well that it looked to the contingency of a collision been
the general and the state authorities. There were statesmen then, who imagined it
possible that a statute of the United States might be so obnoxious in a particular
region, or to a particular state, as that the local functionaries would refuse to obey it,
and would interfere with the officers who were charged to give it force, even by arresting and imprisoning them. In direct antecedence, therefore, to the section under
consideration, they framed two other sections of the same statute, one authorizing
the military forces of the United States, to be employed in aid of the judicial power,
the other authorizing a resort to especial jails for the safe keeping of United States
prisoners. It was necessary to go one step further. The military power might
enforce the execution of the laws, when the marshal had failed and been made a
prisoner himself for attempting to execute them; the prisons specially constituted
might detain those whom the military had arrested; but the officer of the law,
arrested in the discharge of his duty, imprisoned for the offence of attempting-to
discharge it, perhaps at the suit of the resisting state, more probably at the instance
of some private grief, what was to become of him?
This seventh section meets the case, and gives the remedy. Is it credible that
wise men, framing a statute for such an emergency, meant to deny to their judges
to hear the wrong before they adjudicated the redress; or to draw upon the consciences of the men who had instigated the outrage on the officers, and to accept the
recorded formalities, by which the outrage had been consummated, as the only
reliable and legal means for ascertaining facts and legitimate deductions from them ?
It is not to be questioned, that there have been men in some quarters of the
country, whose efforts, if successful, would have made this section as applicable in
spirit, as it is in terms, to cases under the fugitive slave law; and I do not see the
circumstances which at the present moment should make its reasonable construction,
and the proper mode of giving it effect, different.
The whole course of the argument goes to show, that the section applies alike to all
cases in which an officer is imprisoned, because of acts done in pursuance of the
United States laws. It is altogether a fortiori that the relief must extend to cases
of arrest under civil process. The suit of an individual has no claims to superior
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dignity or consideration over a prosecutioninstituted by the State ; nor is it generally
as well considered, or as rightful.
I pass over the argument, which supposes that I am about to try this cause
between the parties to the exclusion of the jury. It is simply founded in mistake.
I can neither acquit or convict. Nor can my action arrest the proceedings in the
State Court, nor have any effect on the trial there. The Act of Congress, which
gives to revenue officers the right to bring themselves for trial into the Circuit Court,
when their official conduct is in question, does not extend to the officers of the
law.
If, therefore, there was such a case made out e pare by Thomas, and such as,
yriza facie and on his affidavits, showed an abuse of authority by the officers, I
should hear the evidence which they wished to offer to repel it. But it is not necessary for me to do this, for there is in truth nothing in them which sufficiently
connects any of the United States officers with the acts of violence of which Thomas
complains.
There is nothing in them to show by whom he was wounded,
nor in what manner,
nor under what provocation, nor with what attending circumstances, nor who pursued, or menaced, or cried "shoot him," or fired or presented pistols. The relators
are in nowise connected with any of these incidents, except that two of them are
doubtingly and imperfectly referred to as having witnessed the scene near the river
bank, and a third as having, a little while after the affair was over, given his name
to a gentleman who inquired for it. As to Keith, the fourth named defendant in the
writ of cayia8, he is neither named, nor described, nor alluded to.
And beyond this there is nothing before me. The plaintiff himself who could
have sworn clearly and affirmatively to all the merits of his case, had made no
affidavit. He could have told us how it came to pass that he was jounded, and
whether he was the aggrieved or the aggressor in the affray. If he was not in fact
the fugitive named in the warrant, and resolutely periled his own life by assailing
the lives of those who were charged to apprehend him-or if they transcended their
authority, and he was beaten without cause; his affidavit might have possessed us
of it all, without a recourse to inference or rumor. He tqo could have identified
the parties that beat, or shot, or menaced him.
What others have sworn to, not only fails to implicate the relators in any act of
violence whatever, but it leaves it absolutely to be guessed at, whether the plaintiff
has been wronged at all. I cannot but.wish that his personal affidavit had been
found with the rest. He is absent; but he has constituted and instructed counsel,
and I am justified in assuming that they have not failed to apprise him that his own
statement, under oath, was the usual, and might be, perhaps, the indispensable condition of success in his application to imprison the relators.
I have already had occasion to observe, that in a case arising under this statute,
I cannot feel myself restricted by the practice that governs applications for bailable
process. But I think it safe to avail myself of the light which that practice reflects
"No plaintiff," says Judge Sergeant, in the case of Nevin v. Aerrie, 2 Wharton
500, "can be considered entitled to demand bail for a cause of action which he can
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neither positively swear to, nor allege sufficient facts and circumstances in the
affidavit to satisfy the judge of its existence." Equally safe, it seems to me, would
be the rule, that an officer of this court should not be detained in prison for an alleged
abuse of his powers, without either a positive oath of merits from the plaintiff, or a
sworn detail of circumstances to supply its place.
Relator: di*charqed.

In the -District Cowrt of the United States for the Wisconsin

-District,November Term, 1854.
CHARLES A. AVERY AND MOSES K. MOODY VS. EDGAR P. DOANE.
1. A married woman living with her husband, having carried on business of trade
in her own name, and purchased goods upon credit, and also having a running
account for goods purchased of her husband, cannot be proceeded against as garnishee in an attachment against her husband.
2. The act of Wisconsin to provide for the protection of married women in the
enjoyment of their own property, does not enable a married woman, while living
with her husband, to carry on trade to the exclusion of him or his creditors, or to
become his debtor in the business of the trade.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
J.-This proceeding was commenced by writ of attachment, which was served on Sarah A. ]Doane, as garnishee. Her
answer was taken before a commissioner of this court; wherein she
states, that she is the wife of the defendant, Edgar P. Doane, and
has been for eighteen years, and that she resides with her husband,
at Green Bay; where she is, and has been engaged in the dry goods,
millinery and fancy goods business, for four years. That she carries on the business, and buys goods in New York and Chicago, in
her own name, principally on credit. She also bought goods on
credit out of her husband's store, before he sold out and stopped
business. She had a running account with her husband. When
she commenced business at Green Bay, her father purchased part
of the goods, amounting to four or five hundred dollars; and gave
her some money as a present. Her business has always been in her
MILLER,
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own hands; and she now gives her husband his board for his assistance and services.
The plaintiff's counsel not being satisfied with the answer of Sarah
A. Doane, of which the foregoing is in substance a part, moved the
court to order an issue, to try her liability as garnishee, under the
statute; which motion is opposed by her counsel, upon the ground,
that being the wife of the defendant in the attachment suit, she is
not answerable in this proceeding, under the circumstances disclosed
in her answer.
There is no law in this State recognizing the custom of London,
whereby married women may carry on the business of trade and
merchandise as frmmes sole, while cohabiting with their husbands.
In some States femmes covert may carry on business asfemmes sole,
in pursuance of statutes, while their husbands are engaged as mariners and absent from the country. This is the extent of legislation
upon this subject, in any of the States, within my knowledge.
It is unnecessary to refer to authorities to prove, that, at common
law, the husband is entitled to the goods and chattels of the wife,
and also to all sums of money which she earns by her own skill and
labor; and that these he has absolutely in his own right.and not in
hers. And if she purchases goods or property, during coverture,
with his assent, and with the proceeds of her labor and saving, they
become his at the moment of the purchase, and he becomes responsible for such as may be purchased upon credit.
It is contended that the act to provide for the protection of married women in the enjoyment of their own property, approved February 1, 1850, chap. 44, changes the common law upon this subject.
The third section of the act is as follows: "Any married female
may receive, by inheritance or by gift, grant, devise or bequest,
from any person other than her husband, and hold to her own and
separate use, and convey and devise, real and personal property,
and any interest br estate therein, and the rents, issues and profits,
in the same manner and with like effect as if she were unmarried,
.and the same shall not, be subject to the disposal of her husband
nor be liable for his debts." The act provides more effectually for
the protection of the wife's property, by dispensing with the neces-
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sary intervention of trustees, than Courts of Equity had done; but
it does not authorize the wife to hold to her own use, to the exclusion of her husband or his creditors, a store of goods purchased by
her upon credit, or the profits or proceeds of trade. By the act,
she might have held, to their exclusion, the money given her by
her father, but nothing more. That was property given her by a
person other than her husband, which she, by the act, could receive,
and not be subject to the disposal of her husband nor liable for his
debts. The goods now in the store, and the notes, accounts, and
cash in hand she did not receive by inheritance, gift, grant, devise,
or bequest, from any person other than her husband, or in any way
known to this act.
The act changes materially the legal incidents of the marriage
relation, but it has not extinguished quite all of the marital rights
of the husband. He is still entitled to the person and labor of his
wife, and to the benefits of her industry and economy. The wife,
by the act, is not degraded to the condition of a hireling, which she
would be if it authorized her to withhold from her husband the proceeds of her own labor; nor is she vested with authority over him, or of
independence of him, in her business transactions of trade, even if
he, as in this instance, after disposing of his goods without paying
his debts, should consent to become her servant for his board. The
defendant, by voluntarily surrendering to his wife his marital au*thority in the control and direction of the business of his family,
cannot compromise the legal rights of his creditors. IHe may consent to serve his wife in the store for his board, but the law entitles
him and his creditors to the goods and the proceeds of sales. The
persons from whom she purchased goods upon credit, with her husband's consent, cannot bring suit against her, but must resort to
him for the recovery of their demands, although the charges in their
books may be to her, or the notes be signed by her alone. As she
cannot contract in business of trade in her own name while living
with her husband, she cannot sue or be sued in her own name upon
transactions connected with the trade, nor be summoned as his garnishee. She can no mora be his debtor, in this particula#;, than
she can hold the goods in store or the avails of sales, to the exclu-
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sion of him or his creditor. The common law has wisely ordered
that property acquired by the wife by purchase, with the consent
of her husband, is in his possession and under his control, and the
act under consideration does not disturb this provision, so essential
to the peace and happiness of families.
The act of this State is copied from that of the State of New
York; where a similar decision was made in Lovett vs. Bobinson
and Witbeck, T Howard's Prac. Rep. 105. And a similar decision
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, upon a similar law, is reported in Baoybold vs. Bjaybold, 8 Harris' Rep. 308. In that case
itis decided that, the fact that real estate was paid for with the
wife's earnings and savings, does not give her a trust estate in the
property; but that money thus acquired is not the property of the
wife, within the meaning of the act, relating to the estate of married women, but is the property of her husband.
For these reasons the proceeding against Sarah A. Doane, is
dismissed, and the application for an issue is overruled.

In the District Court of the United States for the Maryfland
District, January, 1855.
CHARLES REEDER, JR. vS. THE STEAMSHIP GEORGE'S CREEK.

1. Construction of the act of 29th July, 1850, relating to conveyance of vessels.
2. A recorded mortgage of a vessel does not take priority over a subsequent lien,
obtained by a material man, for necessary supplies or repairs.

Libel in rem by a material man, for repairs to the ship.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GILES, J.-This case has been argued and submitted to the Court
upon the following statement of facts:

The.steamer "George's Creek" belongs to the port of New York,
and on the 24th December, 1853, she was mortgaged by her owners
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to Messrs. Knapp & Stacy, of New Ygrk, to secure the payment of
$30,000. That said mortgage was duly recorded in the office of
the Collector of Customs at the port of New York, in which office
the said steamer was enrolled, and also in the office of the Register
of Conveyances for the City of New York.
That under the control and in the employment of her owner she
made frequent trips to the port of Baltimore, and that while here,
during the last summer, certain repairs were made to her by the
libellant, at the request and by the direction of her captain, which
repairs were necessary and proper to enable her to complete her
voyage, and that the prices charged for such repairs are at the
usual and ordinary rates. That this libel was filed on the 18th of
October, 1854, and the steamer was taken under the process of this
Court and released on stipulation.
That on the 16th of September, 1854, a bill was filed in the
Superior Court of the city of New York, by Messrs. Knapp & Stacy,
to obtain a decree for the sale of said steamer, for the payment of
the said mortgage debt, and on the 17th October, 1854, a decree
was passed for the sale of the said vessel, under which decree she
has been sold in New York, since she returned, and the proceeds of
sale were not sufficient to pay the said mortgage claim.
No question has been raised, in the argument of this case, in
reference to the conflict of jurisdiction. But the Court understands
that to be waived, and its opinion to be invoked, and the case to be
put upon the question "whether as against a prior mortgage of a
vessel belonging to another state, recorded according to the provisions of the act of Congress of 29th July, 1850, a material man has
a lien on the vessel for necessary supplies and repairs. No decision
upon this point has been cited to the Court, by either of the counsel,
and the -Court has not been able, after diligent search, to find any.
It is then a new question for the decision of the Court, and must
depend upon the construction which the Court may give to the said
act of 1850.
It is admitted in the argument of this case, that prior to the
passage of the said act of Congress, material men had such a lien
for repairs and supplies to a vessel belonging to another state
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which could be enforced in tbis Court, and which no mortgage or
sale of said vessel, by the owners, could interfere with or defeat.
This arose from two principles of the general maritime law: 1st.
Every contract of the master, within the scope of his authority
as master, in reference to the vessel, .binds the vessel. And 2d. A
man, who repairs or furnishes supplies to a ship, obtains thereby,
without any express contract to that effect, a lien on the ship for
remuneration. The Supreme Court, however, in the case of the
General Smith, 4 Wheaton, 438, has restricted this last principle,
to the cases of foreign ships, or ships in the ports of a state to
which they do not belong. These principles were established by
the general maritime law, for wise and beneficial purposes. Ships,
the subjects of them, were frequently in necessity of repairs and
supplies in distant portions of the world, where their owners were
unknown or without credit, and to enable them to pursue their
voyages, such a lien, of which I have spoken, became a necessity
of the commercial world. And this without any reference to the
condition of the title at home. Now, does the act of 1850, do
anything more than make bills of sale and mortgages of vessels,
when recorded, as valid and good against all persons, as they were
before against the grantors, mortgagors and all persons who had
notice of them? Clearly, before this act, whether a material man
had notice of a prior mortgage or not, it did not affect his lien.
The mortgagee was only responsible for supplies and repairs when
in possession or in receipt of the profits of the voyage. But the
material man suffers no detriment from having no claim upon the
mortgage. His original remedy remains to him. He may proceed
against the mortgagor in personam, or against the ship in rem.
Now this is the law, as laid down by Flanders, in his late most
excellent work on Shipping, a work published-three years after the
passage of the act of 1850, and which act is given in one of the
notes appended to said work. Certainly this intelligent writer did
not consider the act of 1850 as changing the law in this particular.
And I find the same general principle recognized without any exception, in the first volume of Curtis' Commentaries on the Jurisdiction and Practice of the United States Courts, section 51, a work
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which went to press in August last, more than four years after the
passage of the act of 1850. In the case of Weaver vs. The S.
Owens, decided by Judge Grier, in 1849, and reported in 1 Wallace's Reports, 368, that learned Judge remarks, 'that no seizure
by Buck, under his supposed legal title as mortgagee, would defeat
or supersede any liens obtained by the libellants (who were material
men) or others against the ship, while in possession of the Townsends. This was a case where the vessel had been sold by Buck to
the Townsends, a part of the purchase money only paid, and in the
conveyance, it was provided, that if the balance of the purchase
money was, not paid, the Townsends were to forfeit all claim of
ownership in the vessel," and the registry-was not changed. The
supplies were furnished while the ship was in the possession of the
Townsends, under this conditional sale. And in further illustration
of this principle, and the reasons on which it rests, I will read a
passage from the Court's opinion in the case of Cole vs. The
Atlantic, to be found in Crabbe's Reports, 442. "The lien now
sought to be enforced is given to the mechanic who furnishes work
or materials to a vessel in a foreign port, which are necessary for
the prosecution of her voyage. The policy of the law, as well as
the principles of justice, regards this claim with high favor; and it
does so, not more for the security of the mechanic, than for the
general interests of commerce and the particular interests of the
ship owner. A vessel bound on a distant voyage, with a valuable
cargo, meets with a disaster which prevents her proceeding with
safety, although in itself it may not be of much account, and may
be repaired at small expense. She puts into a port where her
owner has neither friends or credit, and unless the repairs can be
made, the voyage will be broken up, and both vessel and cargo exposed to a ruinous diminution'of value. In this situation the law
says to the mechanic, release this vessel from her distress, save her
owner from this loss, and the vessel herself, wherever she goes,
shall be security for your payment. There is some generosity in
the confidence thus given to strangers, because it is not without
considerable hazard. The vessel may be lost, her owners may be
distant or insolvent; the mechanic, nevertheless, permits her to go;
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and the law will not suffer such a claim to be defeated on slight
grounds, but will be astute to prevent it."
But the learned proctor for the claimants, in this case, contends,
that the proviso at the close of the 1st section of the act of 1850,
makes the recorded mortgage prevail over every other lien, except
that created by bottomry bond. N ow, can this be so, and if so,
would it not be most impolitic and unjust? A material man who
repairs a vessel or furnishes supplies to her, in a foreign port, without a bottomry bond, gets only the usual interest on his bill, and
has to follow the vessel, frequently, to her home port, to receive his
claims; and although her owners are liable to him in personam, if
the vessel is lost on the voyage, he has lost his principal security.
But if he refuses to furnish the supplies or lend the money to repair
without a bottomry bond, he gets a heavy rate of interest, sometimes
as high as thirty per cent,, if the vessel reaches her home port. And
a bottomry bond too, is only valid where, the supplies furnished or
money loaned were necessary to enable the vessel to prosecute her
voyage. Now, did Congress mean to draw a distinction between
these two liens, and to give to the one possessing the smaller claim
to our favor the greater efficacy ? I think not, but that it was only
intended by the act of 1850, to give recorded bills of sale or mortgages of vessels, priority over any subsequent conveyance of them,
made by those in possession of them, and over any rights acquired
in them by general creditors, by judgments and by execution; and
that it was not intended to interfere with these liens in favor of
material men, given by the general maritime law. Such a construction of the act is in accordance with the equitable principles which
prevail in the maritime law, and enter so largely into the adjudications of the Admiralty Courts. For all repairs and supplies to
vessels in a foreign port are directly for the benefit of the mortgagee,
by enabling the vessel to prosecute her voyage, and return to her
home port, where she can be in reach of process to enforce his lien;
and by her return adds to the means of the mortgagor to liquidate
his mortgage debt. Entertaining these views I will sign a decree
for the claim of the libellant, with interest and costs. And as this
is a new question, and the twenty-six other cases now pending in
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this Cour, have been entered to abide the decision of this case, I
have reduced my opinion to writing, and will file it in the case.
Since preparing my opinion in this case I have been referred to a
recent decision in the District Court for Massachusetts, as reported
in the Boston Daily Advertiser, of January 11th instant, in which
Judge Sprague decides "that liens founded on the necessity of
vessels abroad, are never displaced by mortgage titles."
Decree for libellant.

In the Washington County Supreme Court, State of Vermont,
November Term, A. D. 1854.
KENDALL BRUCE AND WIFE VS. HIRAM THOMPSON.

1. A marriage settlement incomplete by reason of a want of trustees, is only an
agreement to make a settlement, and will not, at law, exempt the annual crops of
the wife's land from an execution against the husband.
2. By the language of the Vermont Married Woman's Act, the annual product of
the wife's land is not exempted from the husband's control, or from his creditors.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
REDFIELD, CH. J.-This action is brought to recover the value
of property, sold by defendant, as an officer, upon execution, for
the sole debt of the husband, the property being the annual products
of the wife's land, in possession, and carried on at the expense of
the husband. The parties, before their intermarriage, made, in
contemplation of such an event, what they considered a marriage
contract, which was a stipulation between themselves merely, and
without the intervention of trustees, that the wife should enjoy her
separate property, without interference, on the part of the husband.
The statute law of the state, in force, at the time of the crops being
grown, and which it is claimed, controls the matter, was as follows:
"The rents, issues and profits of the real estate of any married
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woman, and the interest of the husband, in her right in any real
estate, shall, during coverture, be exempt from attachment or levy
of execution, for the sole debt of the husband, and no conveyance
by such husband, of such rents, issues and profits, &c., shall be
valid, unless by deed of husband and wife," executed according to
the general laws of the State.
It is claimed first, that the marriage settlement, as it is called,
was sufficient to exempt the annual crops of the wife's land from
attachment and levy of execution on the husband's debt. But
such a control, without the intervention of trustees, will not, at law
certainly, have that effect. Such a control, so executed, is incomplete.
It is, at most, but an agreement to nake a suitable marriage settlement. And the parties, beneficially interested, whether the wife
or children, may, on application to a Court of equity, compel the
execution of such a settlement, as the court shall deem reasonable,
which will then be effective to protect the property at law. 2 Story's
Eq. Jurisp., §§ 983, 999.
In regard to the effect of the statute, which is similar to those of
some of the other American States, there seems to have been, to
some extent, a popular impression, that it would exempt the annual
products of the wife's land, from the control of thb husband, or his
creditors. Such was the decision of the court below, and such the
impression of one member of this court, at the first argument.
But a careful examination of the terms of the statute, cannot fail, we
think, to convince all, that the words used have no very marked
fitness, to express the yearly products of land, which are the joint
results of labor and the use of the land. Rents, issues and profits,
more commonly, in the books certainly signify a chattel real interest
in land, a kind of estate growing out of the land for life, or years,
producing an annual or other rent. And in this statute it is so
coupled with "the interest of the husband in her right in any real
estate," so as to induce the suspicion certainly, that the legislature
supposed they were only limiting the husband's control over such
estate, as he would upon the marriage, acquire in the wife's land,
and really doing nothing more than securing to the wife and family,
the use of the wife's chattels real, and the husband's estate, in her
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lands, whether during coverture or by the courtesy. Their estates,
(although growing out of the wife's lands,) by the common law,
upon the marriage, become vested in the husband, and he may sell,
assign, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of them. 2 Kent's Comm.
113.
They may, too, probably be levied upon, for the sole debt of the
husband, or might have been before this statute. And the statute
of this state, giving the right generally to levy upon leasehold
estates, uses almost the same terms as the statute under consideration. "The rents, issues and profits of real estate, leased for life,
or years, shall be liable to be taken on execution ;" thus showing,
that the two statutes might, very likely, have adopted the same
form of expression de industria. Rent's, issues and profits, too,
apply only to net profits, and such as are of the nature of rent, which
is, as every one understands, a reditus or return, by some one,
holding the land of another, for which he owes such return. Now
the husband holds the wife's land, in no such tenure, but in his own
right, as husband, owing a return to no one. It is observable too,
that the legislature, in providing a homestead for the family, and
securing its annual products for their support, use appropriate and
specific language, by providing that the homestead, "and the yearly
products thereof," shall be exempt from execution, and that the
husband shall not alienate or mortgage the homestead, but no
provision is made against his conveying the yearly product8 of the
homestead.
And if we regard, in the statute under consideration, the terms
"rents, issues and proifits" as equivalent to yearly products, we
must also allow, that this statute has, in express terms, required the
transfer of such yearly products, to be by deed of the husband and
wife jointly, and to give effect to such provision, we must hold, that
any other mode of alienation, even for value, cash in hand, if you
please, or necessaries for the family, or to pay the very laborers
upon the land, is altogether void.
The very use of the term conveyance, in the statute, with reference
to this interest, shows the probable application of the term to some
estate in the realty, for it is scarcely supposable, that the legislature
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would have used such a term, requiring it to be executed, with all
the solemnities of other deeds of real estate, for the transfer of
mere personal chattels.
It may be supposed by some, perhaps, that this construction
gives less adequate protection to the wife's property, which seems
of late to be regarded as a very cherished object by all. But we
can only say, it affords all the protection which the law gives at
present, and to convey the protection the length claimed, would
certainly be attended with serious inconvenience, and often produce
injustice, and for one, I am ready to say, I have no expectation,
the legislature ever supposed they were making any such provision,
or that they ever will, so far as the conveyance .or transfer of the
yearly products of the wife's land is concerned.
Judgment reversed and case remanded.

In the SuTpreme Court of Pennsylvania.
PATTERSON vs. ROBINSON.'

A married woman may give a judgment for the purchase money of real estate, but
execution will be confined to the real estate purchased.

This was an action of debt on a bond given by Arabella Patterson, the plaintiff in error and the defendant below, to William Robinson, Jr., for the purchase money of two lots of ground in Allegheny
City. In 1848, the plaintiff below, conveyed the lots to the defendant, Arabella Patterson. Eighty dollars were paid in hand,
and for the balance, the purchaser, who was a married woman, gave
her own judgment bond. The deed recited that the conveyance was
subject to the payment of the bond. Judgment was entered on the
bond by virtue of the warrant of attorney, which was opened, and
defendant permitted to plead coverture. The fact of coverture was
admitted, and the facts above set forth were submitted in a case
I We

are indebted to the Pittsburg Leg. Int. for this case.
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stated. The Court below, WILLIAMS, P. J., gave judgment for the
plaintiff in an able opinion.
The case was argued by

T. J. Fox Alden, -Esq., for plaintiff in error, and by
Robt. McKnight, E q., for defendant in error.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LEwIs, J.-The power which a married woman exercises over
her real estate, is not a mere naked power; nor is it altogether analogous to a power coupled with an interest. It is the right of disposition incidental to ownership. The "disability of coverture is
thrown around her for the protection of the rights of herself and
her husband. It is a shield for defence-not a weapon for mischief.
When that disability is removed, or, what is the same thing, whenever the law permits her to act in relation to her estate, she acts as
proprietor, and may exercise the rights of one. She has a right,
by law, to sell her estate, with the consent of her husband, provided
there is no coercion. To secure the one, and at the same time to
guard against the other, she is required to unite with him in the
execution of the conveyance, and to separatefrom him in the acknowledgment of it. 6 Harris, 506; 7 Harris, 861. If she exercises, in this form, her right to sell, she may dispose of her estate
upon such terms and conditions as she deems most advisable. She
may, therefore, mortgage it for her husband's debts; for a mortgage
is but a sale on condition. 3 John. Ch. Rep. 144; 7 Harris, 402.
And, for the same reason, she may prescribe such terms, and waive
such privileges, as she thinks proper to prescribe or waive, so long
as her acts are essentially a part of the contract of sale, and bind
nothing but the property sold. This has just been decided in the
case of Black and wife vs. Galway. By the common law, she may
be grantee in a deed, without the consent of her husband. He
may, it is true, divest the estate by his dissent. But if he neither
agree nor disagree, the purchase is good. Baxter vs. Smith, 6;
Bin. 427; 4 Cruise's Dig. 25. She may even be the grantee
upon condition, and she will be bound to perform the condition,
16
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"because it does not charge her -person, but the land." 1 Roll.
Ab. 421 ; 2 Cruise's Dig. 35.
In the case before us, the husband has not disagreed to the conveyance, and the estate is, therefore, vested in the wife. Under the
operation of the act of 1848, it is to be "owned, used and enjoyed
as her separate property." "But the same act that gives her these
advantages, attaches conditions in' law to the grant. The estate is
to be liable for "debts contracted by herself, or in her name, by
any person authorized so to do." It is also to be liable "for debts
contracted for the suppoit and uiaintenance" of her "family, if no
property of the husband can be found." She cannot take the
benefits without performing the conditions. Even under the law,
as it stood before the act of 1848, she could not retain the estate
conveyed, without paying the judgment given for the purchase
money. ieacock et al. vs. PFl,- 2 Harris, 540. But in this case,
the judgment bond for the purchase money is expressly charged
upon the land by the terms of the conveyance. The payment of
'the money is the condition subject to which she accepted the prop-erty, and upon no just principle can she hold it without performing the condition.
Under the act of 1848, her power to purchase gives her a right
to contract for the payment of the consideration money, so far as
to charge the property with- such incumbrdnces as may be agreed
upon to secure its payment. A judgment given for this purpose is,
therefore, not void on the ground of coverture, and the application
to deprive the creditor of the security for his money, was properly
denied. If a Court permitted her to retain the property, and at
the same time refuse to pay the consideration money, it would no
longer deserve its designation of " a place where justice is judicially
administered." Itis iot proposed to charge the womin, personally,
with the judgment; nor are we prepared to say that her other property is chargeable with the debt. But clearly, the property purchased is bound by a judgment given for the consideration money.
It is considered and adjudged, that the judgment of the District
Court be affirmed, to be levied of the two lots, numbered 85 and 86,
on Buena, Vista plan, Second Ward, Allegheny, being the same
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which were conveyed by the said William Robinson to the said Arabella Patterson, by deed of the 1st August, 1848, recorded in vol.
81, page 599, in consideration in part of the judgment aforesaid.

In the District Court for the City of _Philadelphia.
P RITZ VS. FISHER.

1.' A judgment of one court will not be enforced by another, unless it is certain in
itself, or is capable of being made so liy intendment or presumption.
2. It seems, that a defence to thejudgment of another State on the ground of want
of notice should be pleaded; and that when it is not, the judgment will not be held
invalid, merely because the record fails to show that notice was given.

The opinion of the. Court was delivered by
HARE, J.-This is an action of debt against Fisher & Smith,

founded on a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace in
New Jersey.1 The judgment as produced and proved in this
(Copy rOFRacon.)
State of New Jersey, Camden county, as.
In the Court for the trial of small causes, before Joseph B. Strafford, Esq., Justice.
Andrew Fritz, plaintiff,
rs.I
Henry Fisher and George A. Uink,
defendant.

In trespass on the case, damage $100.

May 25, 1853. Issued a summons in the above case, returnable before me on
Wednesday, the 1st day of June next, at 2 o'clock, P. M. Constable returned the
same, as follows: "Served the within May 25, 1853, on the said Henry Fisher, by
reading it to him, a copy not required. C. H. Gordon, Constable."
June 1, 1853. Counsel for both parties sent me a note, requesting a postponement for two weeks, with an arrangement that plaintiff should then have the privilege of filing his state of demand; whereupon I adjourned the trial until the 15th
inst. at 4 o'clock in the afternoon.
June 15, 1853. Parties appeared. Plaintiff filed his state of demand. Trial
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court is against "defendants," but the record shows that Smith wag
the only person served with process, or who appeared in or defended
the action. Fisher, consequently, contended at the trial, that the
judgment as against him was a nullity; that the proof did not sustain the declaration, and that the plaintiff must fail on account of
the variance. The point was reserved and is now before us for decision, and we have also to render judgment on a plea of nul tiel
record, which raises nearly the same. question.
All judgments derive their force from the powers conferred by
the State, on the courts which render them, and are therefore necessarily void when those powers are exceeded. This principle applies
equally to the highest tribunals of Westminster Hall, or our own
country, and to the pettiest magistrate or most inferior court. A
criminal information in the Common Pleas, a common recovery in
the Queen's Bench, an action of ejectment in the high Court of
Chancery, would be all so much waste paper, and could not be
pleaded or given in evidence as a justification, in an action of trespass against the sheriff or any other officer of those courts, who
should act upon them, even in obedience to the commands of his
superiors. This was settled as far back as the case of the Marshalsea,
10 Coke, 68-76, and has never since been questioned. If, says
Lord Coke, citing and relying on the language of the court in the
case of Bower vs. Collin8, in the 22 Edward, 4, 33, b, "the court has
not power and authority, then their proceeding is coram non judice:
as if the Court of Common Pleas hold plea in an appeal of death,
or robbery, or any other appeal, and the defendant is attainted, it
proceeded. Dudley, counsel for plaintiff. Dayton, for defendant. William Small,
Lewis Yeager, Lewis Holtzworth, Restore Cook and David Brinnersholtz, were sworn
as witnesses on part of plaintiff. Plaintiff also offered a transcript from Justice
Curts' docket, and several receipts from defendants to plaintiff, in evidence, which
i'er received. After hearing the witnesses and the paties, Igavy judgment ik
favor of the plaintiff against the defendants for one hundred dollars.danages, sand
twQ dollars and twenty-aeven cents costs.
I do hereby certify the above to be a true transcript from my docket, in the case
as therein named. Witness my hand and seal at Camden city, in said county, this
sixteenth day of November, A. D. eighteen hundred and fifty-three.
[ SEAT ]
JOSEPH B. STRAFFORD, J. P.
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is coram non judice: quod omnes concesserun't." Jurisdiction is presumed, said Parke, B., in delivering the judgment of the Exchequer
Chamber in the ease of dossett vs. Roward, 10 Q. B. 359-543,
"With respect to such writs as are actually issued by superior courts,
that they at6 duly issued, and in a case in which they have jurisdiction, uhless the contrary appears on the face of them, as it would,
for instance, ik 'a writ of capias for a criminal matter issued froi
the Oommoh Pleas, or a writ on a real actioh from the King's
Bench, 'r a real action not in the Crown's case from the Exchequer; in all 'of which c-ses the want of jurisdiction would appear."
When, therefore, a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-mattei
df a cause, its judgment is void, and must be treated as such in
every subsequent proceeding in which it is brought in question.
but whild the law thus strikes all judicial proceedings, which exceed
their proper limits with utter inability, it makes certain presumptions in their favor, Which experience has shown to be essential t6
the repose and safety of society. Thus, superior courts are pregumed to exercise the powers committed to them properly, and their
judgments will be held to be within their jurisdiction, unless the
6ontrary appears on the face of the record, or upon a mere coimjarison of the subject-matter of the judgment, with the authority
of the court. It is not necessary that the record should show jurisdiction, it will be enough if it do not directly or by a necessary
implication negative its existence. This, indeed, is a mere application of the general maxim omnia rite acta, which has a wide and
beneficial influence, not only in law, but in all the walks of life. But
while it is universally conceded, that the record of a superior court
need not show that its powers have been duly exercised over the
subject-matter of the cause, there has been a wide difference of
opinion in this country, whether the same rule applies to its jurisdiction over the persons of the parties, and whether a judgment
can be valid, unless the proceedings on which it is based show, that
the defendant was duly notified of their existence, or made himself
amenable to the authority of the court, by a voluntary appearance.
I say in this country, for I am ignorant of the existence of any case
in England, which justifies the inference, that a domestic judgment
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.of a superior court can be impeached collaterally, on the ground
that the defendant was not served with process; or that a plea of
nul tiel record to an action of debt on a judgment of the Common
Pleas or Exchequer could be sustained, by pointing out the want of
all proof other than the judgment itself, that the defendant was
before the court when it was rendered. In thus using the phrase
other than the judgment, I wish to call attention to the natural presumption, that the court would not have rendered it without giving
the defendant a day in court, on which he might answer the complaint made against him. It is admitted that the return of service
by the sheriff, or the entry of appearance by the clerk cannot be
controverted, and will be presumed to be right, in face of the most
conclusive proof to the contrary; and it would seem that as much
faith should be given to the dcts of the court, as to the allegations
of its officers. It was accordingly held by the Supreme Court of
New York, in Foot vs. Stevens, 17 Wend. 483, and BHart vs.
Seizas, 21 Id., 40, that a judgment cannot be impeached or set
aside collaterally, for the failure of the record to show that the
defendant had notice, or waived it by a voluntary appearance. Nor
does this view of the law, leave the parties who have been injurel
by a judgment rendered without notice, without the means of redress, for they may either set it aside by an application to the
court itself, or reverse it by a writ of error; it merely deprives
them of the right to rely on the defect in a collateral proceeding,
in which the truth of the case cannot be known, or what may be a
mere clerical error corrected.
The principles which have been stated, as sustaining domestic
judgments, seem to apply equally to those of other States. The
same faith and credit which we give to our own records, are due to
those of all the parts of that great whole which we call*our country.
So long as nothing is alleged, or shown to the contrary, their decisions must be presumed to have been guided by the same rules of
justice which dictate our own; and even when this does not appear
on the face of the record, the defect should be supplied by a favorable intendment. The defendant may indeed negative the presumption by pleading and proof; he may show that the court which has
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assumed to bind him, had no authority over his person, and he may
do this not only when the record is silent, but in opposition to its
explicit entries or allegations; but if, instead of adopting this course,
he confine himself to a plea of nul tiel record, and thus shut the
plaintiff out from sustaining the record by extrinsic evidence, the
judgment itself should be sufficient proof of its own validity.
But while the judgments of Superior Courts ought thus to be
regarded as binding, not only in the state in which they are rendered, but elsewhere, until the contrary appears, a different rule

seems to prevail with regard to the judgments of inferior courts. As
the powers under which such courts act are limited, their acts will
be void unless manifestly within the scope of their powers. No presumption can be made in favor of their jurisdiction7; it must actually
appear on the face of their proceedings. This, however, is only
true as it regards their jurisdiction; for if that be proved or conceded, their acts will receive the same favorable construction as
those of superior courts. In other words, if the power of the court
to act, be once shown, it will be presumed to have been properly
exercised. The principle is plain, but its application to the question, whether the record must show that notice was given to the
parties, is not a little difficult. It may be said that as the power to
give notice cannot be denied, the presumption ought to be that it
has been duly exerted. On the other hand, if notice be an indispensable preliminary, without which the court can exercise no jurisdiction over the parties, and, therefore, cannot bind them by its
.decision, the failure to set it forth on the face of the proceedings
will be a fatal defect, and may be relied on as such, in any collateral suit, in which they are pleaded or given in evidence, either as a
defence or cause of action. The English cases are full and explicit
to the point, that notice is indispensably necessary to give validity to
the acts of inferior tribunals, and that proof of the want of notice will
render their judgments nullities; Bagg's case, 11 Reports, 93 b., 99
a. ; Dr. Bentleyj's case, 1 Strange, 537; Bex vs. Benn, 6 Term, 198 ;
Capel vs. Child, 2 C. & ".,-555; Paintervs. The Liverpool Gas
Company, 3 A. & E., 433; _x parte -enning, 10 Q. B. 750; 4
C. B., 507, but are far from being equally explicit, with regard to
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the effect of the failure of the record to show that it has been given.
In Rex vs. Venables, 2 Lord Raymond, 1405, 1 Strange, 630, the
King's Bench sustained a commitment by two justices, notwithstanding the objection that the defendant had not appeared or been summoned, and that it was contrary to natural justice to condemn any one
without giving him an opportunity of being heard; but afterwards
issued a criminal information against the justices, on affidavits that
they had proceeded without notice to the parties interested. A similar point arose in Rex vs. Clay, 1 Strange, 475, where Pratt, 0. J.,
contended, that an order of bastardy was void, in consequence of the
failure of the record to show that the defendant had been summoned,
because it was the act of an inferior court, and no presumption could
be made in its favor, but the puine judges expressed a decided
opinion the other way, on the ground that as the power to issue the
summons was unquestionable, it must be presumed to have been duly
exercised; and Pratt seems to have yielded to their arguments, for
the order was subsequently confirmed without opposition. These
cases, taken in connection with those already cited, would seem to
show, that while the want of notice is fatal, its existence will be
presumed, unless the contrary is apparent on the face of the proceedings, or is shown by extrinsic evidence. But whatever the rule
may be in England, the American decisions establish by a great preponderance of authority, that notice is necessary to give jurisdiction
over the persons of the parties, and that a failure to set it forth in
the proceedings of inferior courts,- will render them void on the
general principle, that the jurisdiction of such courts cannot be presumed, and must appear affirmatively in every essential particular.
These principles might suffice for the solution of the question
now before us, if it related to the record of a court of this state.
We should then know the nature and extent of the powers of the
court, and could determine whether the want of proof of notice could
be supplied by presumption. But the question is as to the validity
of the judgment of another state, to which we owe the same faith
and credit which it would and ought to have in the state in which it
was rendered. Had the defendant pleaded that the judgment was
invalid in New Jersey, and then given the law of that state in evi-
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dence, he would probably have succeeded in sustaining the plea, for
the case of Bess vs. Coles, 3 New Jersey, 116, seems to decide, that
the failure of the record to show that notice was given, renders all
judgments void. But as the defendant has rested his case solely
on the point, whether there is such a judgment as the plaintiff has
averred, we must rest our decision on general principles, without
any special.reference to the law of New Jersey. We have before us
the solemn and official act of one of her magistrates, done in the
discharge of his public duty, and we are bound to presume, not only,
that he acted in pursuance of a power conferred by law, but that
he duly exercised the power under which he acted. The sovereign
authority which resides in every state, may bind its subjects and
citizens by laws, and may not only enforce these laws through the
medium of its tribunals, but may prescribe the mode in which those
tribunals shall exercise the powers confided to their charge. It may
dispense with notice altogether, or make publication a substitute for
notice; and may certainly direct that proof of notice shall, or may
be made otherwise, than by an entry in the minutes or record of the
tribunal. Such a law would unquestionably be obligatory on every
one domiciled within the boundaries of the state which enacted it,
unless contrary to some constitutional prohibition. Whether a
judgment, rendered in accordance with its provisions, would be enforced by the courts of a foreign government, or of a sister state,
would depend on a variety of considerations. It might certainly,
as in the case of judgments in proceedings commenced by attachment, bind and pass rights of property, even if it imposed no personal obligation; and it would probably be personally obligatory
upon a citizen of the state in which it was rendered, unless it contravened some principle of natural justice, or some constitutional restriction. It would therefore seem that no court can be entitled to
pronounce definitively, that the sentence of a foreign tribunal, or
of a sister state, is void, merely because the record fails to show
that notice was given. Whether notice was given or not, and
whether the failure to give it renders the judgment invalid, are
questions which should be raised by proper pleading. That the
judgment of another state is invalid, for want of compliance with +6-
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laws which conferred judicial authority upon the court, and prescribed the mode in which it should be exercised; that those laws are
void or unconstitutional; that the defendant is a citizen of another
state, and not bound by the judgment as an adjudication, for want of
notice, nor as an act of the sovereign power of the state in which it
was rendered, because not subject to its authority, may be, and no
doubt are good defences to an action founded on the judgment. But
unless the defendant himself sets up such a defence, no court can
raise it for him. This would be too plain for argument if the objection were to the jurisdiction of the court over the cause, and is
equally true when the question is as to its authority over the parties.
A judgment of the Orphan's Court of this county, in an action of
covenant, or a decree of this. court surcharging an executor or administrator, would be a mere nullity, and would be unhesitatingly
treated as such in any court of this state, and yet an. action founded
upon such a decree or judgment, in another state, could only be
resisted by pleading the want of jurisdiction, and giving the laws of
this state in evidence, in support of the plea.
It is true, that the 1st section of the 4th article of the Constitution of the United States, and the act of May 26th, 1790, passed
by Congress, in pursuance of that section, make it the duty of the
courts of each state, to give such effect to the records and judicial
proceedings of other states, as they have by law or usage in the
courts of the state where they had their origin. And it may be
contended, that as the imposition of this duty, must confer the power
necessary for its fulfilment, the judges of one state may take judicial cognizance of the laws of another, so far as may be necessary
to ascertain the effect due to its judgments. But the difficulties
attendant on an attempt, by a court, to expound a system of law, to
which it is more or less a stranger, without the aid of specific iniformation, verified, when necessary, by oath, are so great, that the safer
course would seem to be, to adhere to the general rule of comity,
which holds every judicial act of foreign tribunals binding, until some
sufficient cause is shown to the contrary, in such a form as to permit
evidence to be given to sustain or disprove its truth. When,
indeed, the record shows affirmatively, or by a necessary intend-
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ment, that the defendant was not subject to the jurisdiction of the
court, whose decision is produded against him, the case may be
different, for then the judgment is a nullity on its face, which can
hardly-be alleged, when there is no other ground for inferring a
wa'nt of jurisdiction, than the absence of entries going to prove it.
Had, therefore, the judgment in this case been a judgment explicitly against both defendants, in terms to put it beyond all doubt,
that the magistrate, who rendered it, meant to. charge both personally, we should probably have held it binding, even on the one who
may not have been amenable to the Authority of the tribunal from
which it emanated, but who has failed to present the objection in
such a form as to make it available. But all we have in the transcript of the record, now before us, to sho;F that Fisher was meant
to be included in the decision against his co-defendant, Smith, is an
entry of judgment against " defendants." All the previous proceedings, from the institution of the suit down to the time of this
entry, are against Smith only. He is the only person served, the
only person who appears to defend or contest the cause. Would it
be reasonable, under these circumstances, to charge the other
defendant, Fisher, without some better authority than a single 's"
to show that he was included in the decision, without anything to
show what was the nature or extent of the obligation imposed upon
him. The plural may have been used instead of the singular, in
giving the judgment, to make it accord with the writ; the laws of
New Jersey may not permit, the magistrate may not have designed
it to bind both the defendants personally. The common law
held all obligations void, unless they were certain, or capable of
being made so, and applied this rule quite as rigorously to judgments as to other things, as may easily be seen by a recurrence to
the precedents. When a defendant has been served with process,
or has appeared without service, it is reasonable to presume that
a subsequent general judgment, is a judgment against him, for that
which is not certain on the face of the judgment, becomes so, on
looking at the previous proceedings. But to hold that a judgment
shall bind a man, who is not named in it, and who does not appear
to have been before the court when it was rendered, merely be-

